fix: per-endpoint rate limits, request timeout and input hardening

bal-server:
- Wire independent actix-governor buckets per endpoint class (pushtxs,
  searchtx, info/stats, default) so polling a cheap endpoint can no longer
  exhaust the push-txs budget; previously every limit was dead config
- Enforce BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_TIMEOUT_SECS via a request-timeout middleware that
  returns 408 Request Timeout, covering slow request bodies
- De-duplicate txids within a single /pushtxs request body
- Replace the byte-slice xpub detection (panic on non-ASCII) with a safe
  prefix check

bal-pusher:
- Handle malformed/empty ZMQ frames without indexing panics or UTF-8 expect
- Return an error from sign_message and skip the stats report instead of
  panicking when the private key cannot be parsed

validation / db:
- Reject IPv4-mapped IPv6 targets (::ffff:a.b.c.d) in is_valid_welist_url
  to close an SSRF bypass, with unit tests
- Use Path::starts_with for the SQLite forbidden-directory check so paths
  like /etcfoo are not misclassified

misc:
- Add explicit secret patterns to .gitignore and sync the docs

.env.example

@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@
 # DO NOT commit the real token to git!
 # This file is in .gitignore and should not be committed to git
 GITEA_API_TOKEN=your_gitea_api_token_here
-# Example: GITEA_API_TOKEN=5cfa8c33e337ebaadb355c0ffa2d053d521ee43b
+# If a token was ever committed, revoke it and set a new one via the environment.
-# (replace with your actual token after revoking the old one)
 
 # === bal-server ===
 # !!! WARNING: Never bind to 0.0.0.0 in production. Use 127.0.0.1 and place
@@ -33,8 +32,14 @@ BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_DEFAULT_BURST=100
 BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_WORKERS=4
 BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_MAX_CONNECTIONS=100
 
+# === PostgreSQL (optional; used by pg-server.sh) ===
+# pg-server.sh requires BAL_PG_PASSWORD to be set; never commit a real password.
+BAL_PG_PASSWORD=change_me
+BAL_PG_USER=bal
+BAL_PG_DB=baldb
+
 # === bal-pusher ===
-BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE=/var/bal/bal.db
+BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE=/var/bal/bal.db
 BAL_PUSHER_BITCOIN_DIR=/home/bal/.bitcoin
 BAL_PUSHER_SEND_STATS=false
 BAL_SERVER_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9137

.gitignore

@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
 # Secrets and environment files - NEVER commit
 .env
 .env.*
+.env.local
+*.env.local
+.env.production
+.env.secret
 !.env.example
 *.pem
+private_key.pem
+privkey.pem
 !public_key.pem
 *.key
+ec.key
+chiave_privata.key
 
 # Databases
 *.db

Cargo.toml

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ serde = 		{ version = "1.0.152", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = 		{ version = "1.0.116" }
 sqlx = 			{ version = "0.8", features = ["runtime-tokio", "sqlite", "postgres", "chrono"] }
 regex = 		{ version = "1.10.4" }
-tokio = 		{ version = "1", features = ["rt", "net","macros","rt-multi-thread"] }
+tokio = 		{ version = "1", features = ["rt", "net","macros","rt-multi-thread","time"] }
 url = 			{ version = "2" }
 
 # server-only

Dockerfile

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ ENV RUST_LOG=info \
     BAL_SERVER_BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 \
     BAL_SERVER_BIND_PORT=9137 \
     BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE=/var/bal/bal.db \
-    BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE=/var/bal/bal.db \
     BAL_SERVER_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9137 \
     BAL_SERVER_PUB_KEY_PATH=/var/bal/public_key.pem \
     SSL_KEY_PATH=/var/bal/private_key.pem

Dockerfile.release

@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ ENV RUST_LOG=info \
     BAL_SERVER_BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 \
     BAL_SERVER_BIND_PORT=9137 \
     BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE=/var/bal/bal.db \
-    BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE=/var/bal/bal.db \
     BAL_SERVER_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9137 \
     BAL_SERVER_PUB_KEY_PATH=/var/bal/public_key.pem \
     SSL_KEY_PATH=/var/bal/private_key.pem

README.md

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ If no network is specified, defaults to `bitcoin`.
 
 | Variable | Description | Default |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| `BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE` | Path to the SQLite3 database file. | `bal.db` |
+| `BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE` | Path to the SQLite3 database file. | `bal.db` |
 | `BAL_PUSHER_SEND_STATS` | Send stats to welist server. | `false` |
 | `BAL_SERVER_URL` | URL of bal-server (for stats reporting). | - |
 | `SSL_KEY_PATH` | Ed25519 private key for signing stats reports. | `private_key.pem` |

bal-pusher.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -e
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+. "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib.sh"
+
+WORKING_DIR=$(pwd)
+
 export RUST_LOG=trace
 
-export BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE="$(pwd)/bal.db"
+export BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE="$WORKING_DIR/bal.db"
+export BAL_SERVER_DB_BACKEND="postgresql"
 #export BAL_PUSHER_BITCOIN_COOKIE_FILE=/~/.bitcoin/.cookie
 #export BAL_PUSHER_REGTEST_COOKIE_FILE=/~/.bitcoin/regtest/.cookie
 #export BAL_PUSHER_TESTNET_COOKIE_FILE=/~/.bitcoin/testnet3/.cookie
@@ -11,5 +20,10 @@ export BAL_PUSHER_SEND_STATS=true
 export WELIST_SERVER_URL=http://localhost:8086
 export WELIST_SKIP_URL_VALIDATION=true
 export BAL_SERVER_URL="http://127.0.0.1:9133"
-export SSL_KEY_PATH="$(pwd)/private_key.pem"
+export SSL_KEY_PATH="$WORKING_DIR/private_key.pem"
+
+if [ "$BAL_SERVER_DB_BACKEND" = "postgresql" ]; then
+    . "$SCRIPT_DIR/pg-server.sh"
+fi
+
 cargo run --bin=bal-pusher regtest --features=pusher

bal-server.sh

@@ -31,31 +31,7 @@ export BAL_SERVER_REGTEST_FIXED_FEE=1000
 export BAL_SERVER_DB_BACKEND="postgresql"
 
 if [ "$BAL_SERVER_DB_BACKEND" = "postgresql" ]; then
-    PG_CONTAINER="bal-pg"
+    . "$SCRIPT_DIR/pg-server.sh"
-    PG_DSN="${BAL_SERVER_PG_DSN:-postgres://bal:balpass@localhost:5432/baldb}"
-
-    docker rm -f "$PG_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || true
-    echo_i "Starting PostgreSQL container..."
-    docker run -d --name "$PG_CONTAINER" \
-        -e POSTGRES_USER=bal \
-        -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=balpass \
-        -e POSTGRES_DB=baldb \
-        -p 5432:5432 postgres:16-alpine
-
-    echo_i "Waiting for PostgreSQL..."
-    until docker exec "$PG_CONTAINER" pg_isready -U bal >/dev/null 2>&1; do
-        sleep 1
-    done
-    echo_i "PostgreSQL ready at $PG_DSN"
-    export BAL_SERVER_PG_DSN="$PG_DSN"
-
-
-    cleanup() {
-        echo_i "Stopping PostgreSQL container..."
-        docker stop "$PG_CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1
-        docker rm "$PG_CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1
-    }
-    trap cleanup EXIT
 fi
 
 cargo run --bin=bal-server

contrib/download_and_install_bal.sh

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ BAL_SERVER_INFO="$info"
 EOF
 )
 bal_pusher_conf=$(cat << EOF
-BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE=/home/bal/bal.db
+BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE=/home/bal/bal.db
 BAL_PUSHER_BITCOIN_COOKIE_FILE=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin/.cookie
 
 EOF

docs/04_modules_detail.md

@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ This is the async daemon that monitors the blockchain and pushes pending transac
 
 ### Configuration
 All configuration is via environment variables (no config files):
-- `BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE`: Path to SQLite database.
+- `BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE`: Path to SQLite database.
 - `BAL_PUSHER_BITCOIN_DIR`: Bitcoin data directory (for cookie file path).
 - `BAL_PUSHER_SEND_STATS`: Enable/disable remote stats reporting.
 - `BAL_SERVER_URL`: URL of the bal-server for internal communication.

docs/06_database_schema.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 ## Database Technology
 - **Engine:** `sqlite` (Rust `sqlite` crate, version 0.34.0)
-- **File:** `bal.db` (default, configurable via `BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE` / `BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE`)
+- **File:** `bal.db` (default, configurable via `BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE`)
 - **Connection Management:** Shared `Arc<Mutex<Connection>>` in `bal-server`, single connection in `bal-pusher`.
 - **WAL Mode:** Enabled via `PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL` with retry logic (up to 5 attempts) for concurrent access safety.
 - **Busy Timeout:** Set to 5000ms via `PRAGMA busy_timeout=5000`.

docs/07_deployment_and_ops.md

@@ -41,25 +41,30 @@ Example: `BAL_SERVER_REGTEST_ADDRESS=tpub...`, `BAL_SERVER_BITCOIN_FIXED_FEE=500
 | `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_WORKERS` | `4` | Number of actix-web worker threads |
 | `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_MAX_CONNECTIONS` | `100` | Maximum concurrent connections |
 | `BAL_SERVER_TRUSTED_PROXY` | `127.0.0.1` | Trusted reverse proxy IP for rate-limiting client identification |
-| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_PUSHTXS_PER_SEC` | `1` | Rate limit: requests per second (applied to all endpoints) |
+| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_PUSHTXS_PER_SEC` | `1` | Rate limit: push txs requests per second |
-| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_PUSHTXS_BURST` | `3` | Rate limit: burst size (applied to all endpoints) |
+| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_PUSHTXS_BURST` | `3` | Rate limit: push txs burst size |
 | `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_SEARCHTX_PER_SEC` | `5` | Rate limit: searchtx requests per second |
 | `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_SEARCHTX_BURST` | `10` | Rate limit: searchtx burst size |
-| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_INFO_PER_SEC` | `20` | Rate limit: info requests per second |
+| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_INFO_PER_SEC` | `20` | Rate limit: info/stats requests per second |
-| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_INFO_BURST` | `30` | Rate limit: info burst size |
+| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_INFO_BURST` | `30` | Rate limit: info/stats burst size |
-| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_DEFAULT_PER_SEC` | `50` | Rate limit: default requests per second |
+| `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_DEFAULT_PER_SEC` | `50` | Rate limit: default requests per second (`/`, `/.pub_key.pem`, `/version`) |
 | `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_DEFAULT_BURST` | `100` | Rate limit: default burst size |
 
+Each endpoint class has its own independent token bucket, keyed by the real
+client IP (see `BAL_SERVER_TRUSTED_PROXY`). `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_TIMEOUT_SECS` is
+enforced by a request-timeout middleware that returns `408 Request Timeout` if
+the handler (including request body reading) exceeds the limit.
+
 ### `bal-pusher` (prefixed `BAL_PUSHER_`)
 
 #### Core Settings
 
 | Variable | Default | Description |
 |----------|---------|-------------|
-| `BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE` | `"bal.db"` | Path to the SQLite database file |
+| `BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE` | `"bal.db"` | Path to the SQLite database file |
 | `BAL_PUSHER_BITCOIN_DIR` | `""` | Bitcoin data directory (for cookie file path resolution) |
 | `BAL_PUSHER_SEND_STATS` | `false` | Enable/disable remote stats reporting |
-| `BAL_SERVER_URL` | `"http://localhost/"` | URL of the bal-server for internal communication |
+| `BAL_SERVER_URL` | `"http://127.0.0.1:9133"` | URL of the bal-server for internal communication |
 | `SSL_KEY_PATH` | `"privkey.pem"` | Path to Ed25519 private key for signing stats |
 | `BAL_PUSHER_PREFER_IPV6` | `false` | Pin HTTP connection to first IPv6 address (for broken IPv4 routes) |
 | `WELIST_SERVER_URL` | `"https://welist.bitcoin-after.life"` | URL to POST signed stats to (validated against SSRF) |

docs/08_security_audit.md

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 **Description:** All `unwrap()`/`expect()` calls on critical paths have been replaced with safe error handling.
 **Mitigation Applied:**
 - `bal-server`: `from_utf8` returns 400, `sqlite::open` uses `open_db()` with validation, all handlers return proper HTTP status codes.
-- `bal-pusher`: RPC failures log errors + sleep + retry (no panic), ZMQ `recv` uses `set_rcvtimeo(5000)`, `fs::read_to_string` uses `match` + 500, `cfg.lock()` uses `poisoned.into_inner()` recovery.
+- `bal-pusher`: RPC failures log errors + sleep + retry (no panic), ZMQ `recv` uses `set_rcvtimeo(5000)`, malformed ZMQ frames are handled with `get()`/`first()` and `from_utf8_lossy` (no indexing or UTF-8 `expect`), stats signing returns an error that is logged and skipped rather than `expect`-panicking.
 **Regression Tests:** `tests/panic_regression_tests.rs` (2 tests).
 
 ### 3. Secret Leakage (FIXED)
@@ -52,18 +52,20 @@
 **Description:** All DoS vectors mitigated via actix-web migration.
 **Mitigation Applied:**
 - Body size limit: `PayloadConfig::default().limit(max_body_size)` via `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_MAX_BODY_SIZE` (default 1 MiB).
-- Rate limiting: `actix-governor` with token-bucket per client IP (`BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_PUSHTXS_PER_SEC`/`BURST`). Uses `RealIpKeyExtractor` to extract real client IP from proxy headers.
+- Rate limiting: `actix-governor` with a token bucket per client IP, with an **independent bucket for each endpoint class** (push txs, searchtx, info/stats, default) so that polling a cheap endpoint cannot exhaust the push-txs budget. Uses `RealIpKeyExtractor` to extract the real client IP from proxy headers.
 - Connection limits: `workers(4)` and `max_connections(100)` via `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_WORKERS`/`MAX_CONNECTIONS`.
-- Body timeout: configurable via `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_TIMEOUT_SECS`.
+- Request timeout: `middleware::from_fn` wraps every handler in `tokio::time::timeout`, returning `408 Request Timeout` when `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_TIMEOUT_SECS` (default 5) elapses, covering slow request bodies.
 - ZMQ timeout: `set_rcvtimeo(5000)` prevents infinite blocking.
 - RPC retry: sleep + retry on connection failure instead of panic.
+- ZMQ message handling is panic-free: multipart frames are accessed with `get()`/`first()` and topics are decoded with `from_utf8_lossy`, so malformed frames cannot abort the pusher.
+- Stats-report signing failures are logged and skipped instead of panicking the pusher when the key is unreadable.
 
 ### 5. SSRF / Network Abuse via `reqwest` (FIXED)
 **Severity:** MEDIUM | **Status:** Fixed
 **Location:** `src/bin/bal-pusher.rs`, `src/validation.rs`
 **Description:** URL validation prevents redirecting requests to internal/private IPs.
-**Mitigation Applied:** `is_valid_welist_url()` in `src/validation.rs` blocks localhost, loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, unspecified, and IPv6 unique-local addresses. HTTPS-only scheme enforced.
+**Mitigation Applied:** `is_valid_welist_url()` in `src/validation.rs` blocks localhost, loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, unspecified, IPv6 unique-local addresses, and **IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses** (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) that route to loopback/private/link-local/unspecified IPv4 targets. HTTPS-only scheme enforced. Note: hostnames are not DNS-resolved before validation, so a domain that resolves to a private address is not caught by this check — restrict `WELIST_SERVER_URL` to trusted values.
-**Regression Tests:** `tests/ssrf_tests.rs` (integration) + 8 unit tests in `src/validation.rs`.
+**Regression Tests:** `tests/ssrf_tests.rs` (integration) + 11 unit tests in `src/validation.rs`.
 
 ### 6. Insecure Database Access (FIXED)
 **Severity:** MEDIUM | **Status:** Fixed
@@ -130,16 +132,17 @@
 6. Use read-only filesystem for the server binary.
 
 ### Application-Level
-1. **Rate Limiting:** Implemented via `actix-governor` with token-bucket per client IP. `RealIpKeyExtractor` identifies clients behind reverse proxy using `X-Real-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For` headers. Trusted proxy IP configurable via `BAL_SERVER_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+1. **Rate Limiting:** Implemented via `actix-governor` with token-bucket per client IP and a **separate bucket per endpoint class**. `RealIpKeyExtractor` identifies clients behind reverse proxy using `X-Real-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For` headers. Trusted proxy IP configurable via `BAL_SERVER_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
 2. **Input Validation:** Network enum check, txid hex validation, body size limits.
-3. **HTTPS:** Via Nginx reverse proxy with Let's Encrypt.
+3. **Request Timeout:** `tokio::time::timeout` middleware returns `408` when a handler (including body read) exceeds `BAL_SERVER_ACTIX_TIMEOUT_SECS`.
-4. **WAL Mode:** Enabled with retry logic for concurrent access.
+4. **HTTPS:** Via Nginx reverse proxy with Let's Encrypt.
-5. **ZMQ Timeout:** 5-second receive timeout prevents infinite blocking.
+5. **WAL Mode:** Enabled with retry logic for concurrent access.
-6. **Transaction Size Limits:** Configurable via rate limiting and body size.
+6. **ZMQ Timeout:** 5-second receive timeout prevents infinite blocking.
-7. **ZMQ Retry:** Reconnect logic with timeout-based detection.
+7. **Transaction Size Limits:** Configurable via rate limiting and body size.
-8. **Fee Limits:** Per-network `fixed_fee` configuration.
+8. **ZMQ Retry:** Reconnect logic with timeout-based detection.
-9. **Network Limits:** Only known networks accepted (bitcoin, testnet, testnet4, signet, regtest).
+9. **Fee Limits:** Per-network `fixed_fee` configuration.
-10. **Locktime Reasonableness:** Locktime compared against blockchain height and median time with threshold-based distinction.
+10. **Network Limits:** Only known networks accepted (bitcoin, testnet, testnet4, signet, regtest).
+11. **Locktime Reasonableness:** Locktime compared against blockchain height and median time with threshold-based distinction.
 
 ---
 
@@ -153,4 +156,4 @@
 | `tests/secret_leakage_tests.rs` | 3 | .gitignore, no tracked secrets, no hardcoded tokens |
 | `tests/input_validation_tests.rs` | 4 | Address caching, network validation, txid hex validation |
 | `tests/db_path_validation.rs` | 5 | Path traversal, forbidden dirs, symlinks, WAL pragma, valid paths |
-| `src/validation.rs` (inline) | 8 | SSRF URL validation unit tests |
+| `src/validation.rs` (inline) | 11 | SSRF URL validation unit tests |

pg-server.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -e
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+. "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib.sh"
+
+PG_CONTAINER="bal-pg"
+PG_USER="${BAL_PG_USER:-bal}"
+PG_DB="${BAL_PG_DB:-baldb}"
+# The password MUST come from the environment; never hardcode it.
+PG_PASSWORD="${BAL_PG_PASSWORD:?BAL_PG_PASSWORD must be set (see .env.example)}"
+PG_DSN="${BAL_SERVER_PG_DSN:-postgres://${PG_USER}:${PG_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/${PG_DB}}"
+
+if docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -q "^${PG_CONTAINER}$"; then
+    echo_i "PostgreSQL container '$PG_CONTAINER' is already running"
+elif docker ps -a --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -q "^${PG_CONTAINER}$"; then
+    echo_i "Starting existing PostgreSQL container '$PG_CONTAINER'..."
+    docker start "$PG_CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1
+else
+    echo_i "Creating PostgreSQL container '$PG_CONTAINER'..."
+    docker run -d --name "$PG_CONTAINER" \
+        -e POSTGRES_USER="$PG_USER" \
+        -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD="$PG_PASSWORD" \
+        -e POSTGRES_DB="$PG_DB" \
+        -p 5432:5432 postgres:16-alpine
+fi
+
+echo_i "Waiting for PostgreSQL..."
+until docker exec "$PG_CONTAINER" pg_isready -U "$PG_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1; do
+    sleep 1
+done
+# Do not echo the DSN: it embeds the password.
+echo_s "PostgreSQL ready (user=$PG_USER, db=$PG_DB, host=localhost:5432)"
+export BAL_SERVER_PG_DSN="$PG_DSN"

src/bin/bal-pusher.rs

@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ struct MyConfig {
 impl Default for MyConfig {
     fn default() -> Self {
         MyConfig {
-            db_backend: env::var("BAL_PUSHER_DB_BACKEND").unwrap_or("sqlite".to_string()),
+            db_backend: env::var("BAL_SERVER_DB_BACKEND").unwrap_or("sqlite".to_string()),
-            db_file: env::var("BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE").unwrap_or("bal.db".to_string()),
+            db_file: env::var("BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE").unwrap_or("bal.db".to_string()),
-            pg_dsn: env::var("BAL_PUSHER_PG_DSN").unwrap_or_default(),
+            pg_dsn: env::var("BAL_SERVER_PG_DSN").unwrap_or_default(),
             bitcoin_dir: env::var("BAL_PUSHER_BITCOIN_DIR").unwrap_or("".to_string()),
             regtest: get_network_params_default(Network::Regtest),
             testnet: get_network_params_default(Network::Testnet),
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ impl Default for MyConfig {
                 .unwrap_or("false".to_string())
                 .parse::<bool>()
                 .unwrap_or(false),
-            url: env::var("BAL_SERVER_URL").unwrap_or("http://localhost/".to_string()),
+            url: env::var("BAL_SERVER_URL").unwrap_or("http://127.0.0.1:9133".to_string()),
             ssl_key_path: env::var("SSL_KEY_PATH").unwrap_or("privkey.pem".to_string()),
         }
     }
@@ -388,7 +388,13 @@ async fn send_stats_report(
             cfg.url, chain, bcinfo.blocks, bcinfo.median_time, bcinfo.best_block_hash
         );
         trace!("message to be sent: {}", message);
-        let sign = sign_message(cfg.ssl_key_path.as_str(), message.as_str());
+        let sign = match sign_message(cfg.ssl_key_path.as_str(), message.as_str()) {
+            Ok(signature) => signature,
+            Err(e) => {
+                error!("Cannot sign stats report, skipping: {}", e);
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+        };
         let response = client
             .post(url)
             .header("User-Agent", format!("bal-pusher/{}", VERSION))
@@ -414,22 +420,22 @@ async fn send_stats_report(
     }
     Ok(())
 }
-fn sign_message(private_key_path: &str, message: &str) -> String {
+fn sign_message(private_key_path: &str, message: &str) -> Result<String, Box<dyn StdError>> {
-    let signing_key =
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::read_pkcs8_pem_file(private_key_path)
-        SigningKey::read_pkcs8_pem_file(private_key_path).expect("failed to parse private key PEM");
+        .map_err(|e| format!("failed to parse private key PEM at {private_key_path}: {e}"))?;
     let signature = signing_key.sign(message.as_bytes());
 
-    general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(signature.to_bytes())
+    Ok(general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(signature.to_bytes()))
 }
 
 fn parse_env(cfg: &mut MyConfig) {
-    if let Ok(value) = env::var("BAL_PUSHER_DB_BACKEND") {
+    if let Ok(value) = env::var("BAL_SERVER_DB_BACKEND") {
         cfg.db_backend = value;
     }
-    if let Ok(value) = env::var("BAL_PUSHER_DB_FILE") {
+    if let Ok(value) = env::var("BAL_SERVER_DB_FILE") {
         cfg.db_file = value;
     }
-    if let Ok(value) = env::var("BAL_PUSHER_PG_DSN") {
+    if let Ok(value) = env::var("BAL_SERVER_PG_DSN") {
         cfg.pg_dsn = value;
     }
     cfg.regtest = parse_env_netconfig(cfg, "regtest");
@@ -561,12 +567,12 @@ async fn main() -> std::io::Result<()> {
             );
         }
         consecutive_timeouts = 0;
-        let topic = message[0].clone();
+        let Some(topic) = message.first().cloned() else {
-        let body = message[1].clone();
+            warn!("ZMQ: received empty multipart message, skipping");
-        debug!(
+            continue;
-            "ZMQ:GET TOPIC: {}",
+        };
-            String::from_utf8(topic.clone()).expect("invalid topic")
+        let body = message.get(1).cloned().unwrap_or_default();
-        );
+        debug!("ZMQ:GET TOPIC: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&topic));
         trace!("ZMQ:GET BODY: {}", hex::encode(&body));
         if topic == b"hashblock" {
             info!("NEW BLOCK: {}", hex::encode(&body));

src/bin/bal-server.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
-use actix_governor::{Governor, GovernorConfigBuilder, KeyExtractor, SimpleKeyExtractionError};
+use actix_governor::{
-use actix_web::dev::ServiceRequest;
+    Governor, GovernorConfig, GovernorConfigBuilder, KeyExtractor, SimpleKeyExtractionError,
-use actix_web::middleware;
+};
+use actix_web::body::MessageBody;
+use actix_web::dev::{ServiceRequest, ServiceResponse};
+use actix_web::middleware::{self, Next};
 use actix_web::web::Bytes;
-use actix_web::{App, HttpResponse, HttpServer, Responder, web};
+use actix_web::{App, Error, HttpResponse, HttpServer, Responder, web};
 use bitcoin::{Network, Transaction, consensus};
 use chrono::Utc;
 use hex_conservative::FromHex;
@@ -13,6 +16,7 @@ use std::env;
 use std::fs;
 use std::net::IpAddr;
 use std::str::FromStr;
+use std::time::Duration;
 
 use bal_server::db::{
     DatabasePool, InsertInpData, InsertOutData, InsertTxData, check_duplicate_txids,
@@ -123,7 +127,6 @@ pub struct StatsResponse {
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-#[expect(dead_code)]
 struct ActixConfig {
     max_body_size: usize,
     timeout_secs: u64,
@@ -287,6 +290,44 @@ impl KeyExtractor for RealIpKeyExtractor {
     }
 }
 
+/// Concrete governor configuration type used by all rate-limited routes.
+///
+/// `NoOpMiddleware` is the default `actix-governor` middleware; it is only used
+/// here as a type parameter so a single helper can build every route's config.
+type GovernorConfigType =
+    GovernorConfig<RealIpKeyExtractor, actix_governor::governor::middleware::NoOpMiddleware>;
+
+/// Build a rate-limiter configuration keyed by the real client IP.
+///
+/// A period of zero is rejected by `actix-governor`, so the values are clamped
+/// to a minimum of one to avoid a `None` result.
+fn build_governor_config(per_sec: u64, burst: u32) -> Result<GovernorConfigType, String> {
+    GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+        .seconds_per_request(per_sec.max(1))
+        .burst_size(burst.max(1))
+        .key_extractor(RealIpKeyExtractor)
+        .finish()
+        .ok_or_else(|| "invalid rate limiter configuration".to_string())
+}
+
+/// Middleware that aborts a request with `408 Request Timeout` if the inner
+/// handler (including request body reading) exceeds the configured duration.
+///
+/// The duration is read from the `web::Data<u64>` app data registered in `main`.
+async fn request_timeout<B>(
+    timeout_secs: web::Data<u64>,
+    req: ServiceRequest,
+    next: Next<B>,
+) -> Result<ServiceResponse<B>, Error>
+where
+    B: MessageBody,
+{
+    match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(**timeout_secs), next.call(req)).await {
+        Ok(result) => result,
+        Err(_) => Err(actix_web::error::ErrorRequestTimeout("request timeout")),
+    }
+}
+
 async fn echo_info(
     path: web::Path<String>,
     data: web::Data<AppState>,
@@ -464,6 +505,7 @@ fn parse_request_transactions(
     known_addresses: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<(ParsedTx, String, u64)> {
     let mut result: Vec<(ParsedTx, String, u64)> = Vec::new();
+    let mut seen_txids: HashSet<String> = HashSet::new();
 
     for line in strbody.split('\n') {
         if line.is_empty() {
@@ -489,6 +531,10 @@ fn parse_request_transactions(
         };
 
         let txid = tx.compute_txid().to_string();
+        if !seen_txids.insert(txid.clone()) {
+            trace!("duplicate txid {} in request body, skipping", txid);
+            continue;
+        }
         let ntxid = tx.compute_ntxid();
         let wtxid = tx.compute_wtxid();
         let locktime = tx.lock_time.to_string();
@@ -750,7 +796,10 @@ fn parse_env_netconfig(cfg: &mut MyConfig, chain: &str) {
     if let Ok(value) = env::var(format!("BAL_SERVER_{}_ADDRESS", chain.to_uppercase())) {
         debug!("BAL_SERVER_{}_ADDRESS: {}", chain.to_uppercase(), value);
         c.address = value;
-        if c.address.len() > 5 && &c.address[1..4] == "pub" {
+        let is_xpub = ["xpub", "ypub", "zpub", "tpub", "vpub", "upub"]
+            .iter()
+            .any(|prefix| c.address.starts_with(prefix));
+        if is_xpub {
             c.xpub = true;
             trace!("is_xpub");
         }
@@ -813,12 +862,26 @@ async fn main() -> std::io::Result<()> {
     let bind_address = data.cfg.bind_address.clone();
     let bind_port = data.cfg.bind_port;
 
-    let governor_conf = GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
+    // One shared limiter per endpoint class: all workers clone the same
-        .seconds_per_request(actix_cfg.rate_limit_pushtxs.0)
+    // underlying state, so the rate limit is global per real client IP.
-        .burst_size(actix_cfg.rate_limit_pushtxs.1)
+    let governor_pushtxs = build_governor_config(
-        .key_extractor(RealIpKeyExtractor)
+        actix_cfg.rate_limit_pushtxs.0,
-        .finish()
+        actix_cfg.rate_limit_pushtxs.1,
-        .unwrap();
+    )
+    .map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
+    let governor_searchtx = build_governor_config(
+        actix_cfg.rate_limit_searchtx.0,
+        actix_cfg.rate_limit_searchtx.1,
+    )
+    .map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
+    let governor_info =
+        build_governor_config(actix_cfg.rate_limit_info.0, actix_cfg.rate_limit_info.1)
+            .map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
+    let governor_default = build_governor_config(
+        actix_cfg.rate_limit_default.0,
+        actix_cfg.rate_limit_default.1,
+    )
+    .map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
 
     println!("Starting server on http://{}:{}", bind_address, bind_port);
 
@@ -827,16 +890,45 @@ async fn main() -> std::io::Result<()> {
             .app_data(web::PayloadConfig::default().limit(actix_cfg.max_body_size))
             .app_data(data.clone())
             .app_data(web::Data::new(actix_cfg.trusted_proxy))
+            .app_data(web::Data::new(actix_cfg.timeout_secs))
             .wrap(middleware::Logger::default())
             .wrap(middleware::Compress::default())
-            .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_conf))
+            .wrap(middleware::from_fn(request_timeout))
-            .service(web::resource("/").route(web::get().to(echo_home)))
+            .service(
-            .service(web::resource("/.pub_key.pem").route(web::get().to(echo_pub_key)))
+                web::resource("/")
-            .service(web::resource("/version").route(web::get().to(echo_version)))
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_default))
-            .service(web::resource("/{network}/info").route(web::get().to(echo_info)))
+                    .route(web::get().to(echo_home)),
-            .service(web::resource("/{network}/stats").route(web::get().to(echo_stats)))
+            )
-            .service(web::resource("/{network}/pushtxs").route(web::post().to(echo_push)))
+            .service(
-            .service(web::resource("/searchtx").route(web::post().to(echo_search)))
+                web::resource("/.pub_key.pem")
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_default))
+                    .route(web::get().to(echo_pub_key)),
+            )
+            .service(
+                web::resource("/version")
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_default))
+                    .route(web::get().to(echo_version)),
+            )
+            .service(
+                web::resource("/{network}/info")
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_info))
+                    .route(web::get().to(echo_info)),
+            )
+            .service(
+                web::resource("/{network}/stats")
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_info))
+                    .route(web::get().to(echo_stats)),
+            )
+            .service(
+                web::resource("/{network}/pushtxs")
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_pushtxs))
+                    .route(web::post().to(echo_push)),
+            )
+            .service(
+                web::resource("/searchtx")
+                    .wrap(Governor::new(&governor_searchtx))
+                    .route(web::post().to(echo_search)),
+            )
     })
     .workers(actix_cfg.workers)
     .max_connections(actix_cfg.max_connections)

src/db/mod.rs

@@ -38,13 +38,23 @@ fn validate_sqlite_path(dsn: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
     // If absolute, block known sensitive system directories
     if p.is_absolute() {
         let forbidden = [
-            "/etc", "/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/usr", "/bin", "/sbin", "/lib", "/opt",
+            Path::new("/etc"),
+            Path::new("/proc"),
+            Path::new("/sys"),
+            Path::new("/dev"),
+            Path::new("/usr"),
+            Path::new("/bin"),
+            Path::new("/sbin"),
+            Path::new("/lib"),
+            Path::new("/opt"),
         ];
         for prefix in &forbidden {
-            if path_str.starts_with(prefix) {
+            // `Path::starts_with` matches whole path components, so "/etcfoo"
+            // is not treated as being under "/etc".
+            if p.starts_with(prefix) {
                 return Err(format!(
                     "Absolute database path under {} is forbidden",
-                    prefix
+                    prefix.display()
                 ));
             }
         }

src/validation.rs

@@ -65,6 +65,19 @@ pub fn is_valid_welist_url(url_str: &str) -> bool {
                 {
                     return false;
                 }
+
+                // IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g. `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) are
+                // routed to the embedded IPv4 address on dual-stack hosts, so
+                // they must be validated against the IPv4 rules as well.
+                if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped()
+                    && (v4.is_loopback()
+                        || v4.is_private()
+                        || v4.is_link_local()
+                        || v4.is_unspecified()
+                        || v4.is_multicast())
+                {
+                    return false;
+                }
             }
         }
     }
@@ -154,6 +167,38 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_ipv4_mapped_ipv6() {
+        assert!(
+            !is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped loopback should be blocked"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped private address should be blocked"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:172.16.0.1]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped private address should be blocked"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped private address should be blocked"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped link-local address should be blocked"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:0.0.0.0]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped unspecified address should be blocked"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            is_valid_welist_url("https://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]"),
+            "IPv4-mapped public address should be allowed"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_malformed_urls() {
         assert!(!is_valid_welist_url("not a url"));