- Add make_ping_key_revocation.py: onion revocations are signed by the
identity key, DNS TXT revocations are self-signed by the revoked key
- Document the revocation format, endpoint, helper usage, lifetime and
no-revocation-of-identity-key limits
- Update the security audit, references and env docs for the new flow and
the v2/onion-only scope
- Correct WELIST_ALLOW_LEGACY_PING: legacy pings are accepted by default,
the flag only disables them.
- Describe onion delegation: v2-only inclusion, service-side host
normalization, strict expiry check, deployment order and rollback.
- Warn that disabled delegation rejects onion pings when SSL_KEY_PATH is
the dedicated ping key.
- Document certificate lifetime and revocation limits, offline master
key requirements, helper --days bounds, and a delegation verification
checklist.
- Fix the bal-pusher.sh comment about the service-side defaults.
- Load WELIST_PING_DELEGATION_FILE into a typed OnionDelegation
- Send the certificate only with v2 pings for onion hosts
- Validate the onion host, expiry and delegated key against
BAL_SERVER_URL and SSL_KEY_PATH at startup; disable delegation
with a warning on any mismatch
- Stop sending unsigned info/base_fee/version with v1 pings so
v1 remains liveness-only
- Document v1/v2 metadata handling and onion delegation implications
- Add contrib/make_onion_delegation.py to issue certificates offline,
with Ed25519 key validation and clean CLI error handling
- Add WELIST_PING_SIG_VERSION (1 legacy, 2 canonical JSON); default 1
- Sign WELIST-PING-V2\n + compact sorted JSON covering url, chain, height,
median_time, last_block_hash, info, base_fee, version and sig_version
- Fetch info/base_fee/version from the local /{chain}/info endpoint and sign them
- Fall back to null metadata on fetch failure; skip the fetch for onion URLs
- Normalize the advertised URL and bound metadata to match the WeTime service
- Activate v2 in bal-pusher.sh and document the TXT record setup
- Add unit tests for canonical payloads, URL normalization, metadata and onion detection
Includes previously uncommitted local deployment hardening:
- pg-server.sh configurable loopback bind address, volume and recreate handling
- .env loading in bal-server.sh and bal-pusher.sh
- second bal-server/bal-pusher development scripts
- Correct per-endpoint rate limit tables to reflect actual single global config
- Document RealIpKeyExtractor behavior (X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For behind proxy)
- Add BAL_SERVER_TRUSTED_PROXY env var to all relevant docs
- Update security audit and modules detail with proxy-aware rate limiting
- Fix framework references (actix-web, not hyper)
- Update all env var names (BAL_SERVER_*/BAL_PUSHER_* prefix)
- Add validation.rs module documentation
- Fix function signatures in xpub.rs and db.rs
- Update API response formats (InfoResponse, StatsResponse)
- Fix database schema (date_creation/date_update, push_err, tbl_stats)
- Mark fixed vulnerabilities with current status
- Add Docker support and actix tuning documentation
- Remove outdated references (confy, bal-stats.rs.dontcompile)
- Add regression test summary table
- Add docs/INDEX.md with navigable index and quick reference guides
- Add 9 knowledge base files covering project overview, Bitcoin domain,
architecture, modules, API reference, database schema, deployment/security
- Update AGENTS.md with knowledge base reference and update policy
- Add tests/sql_injection_tests.rs with regression tests for SQL injection
- Fix SQL injection vulnerabilities in bal-pusher.rs:
* Replace string-formatted UPDATE IN with loop + parameterized queries
* Replace string-formatted UPDATE push_err with parameterized query
* Add chain name validation in calculate_stats to prevent env var tampering
- Update .gitignore to exclude bal-pusher.env and bal-pusher.sh