- Point 5 (SSRF): Add URL validation for WELIST_SERVER_URL (src/validation.rs) - Point 6 (DB Access): Add DB path validation, symlink check, WAL mode (open_db) - Point 8 (HTTPS): Extract nginx config, add deployment checklist, bind warnings - Point 9 (Input Validation): Add NETWORKS check (404 for unknown), txid 64-hex validation - Optimize echo_push: parse transactions outside DB lock, batch duplicate check, N+1 xpub lookup eliminated via HashSet cache - Optimize echo_info: derive BIP32 address outside DB lock, minimize lock duration - Fix echo_stats SQL injection via parameter binding + add idx_stats_chain index - New regression tests: ssrf_tests, db_path_validation, input_validation_tests
177 lines
6.0 KiB
Rust
177 lines
6.0 KiB
Rust
use std::fs;
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use std::path::Path;
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#[test]
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fn test_gitignore_protection_env() {
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let gitignore =
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fs::read_to_string(".gitignore").expect(".gitignore file not found in project root");
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// Check that .env and .pem files are blocked
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let required_patterns = vec![
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".env",
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"*.env",
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"*.env.local",
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".env.production",
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".env.secret",
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"*.pem",
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"!public_key.pem",
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"*.key",
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"private_key.pem",
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"privkey.pem",
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"ec.key",
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"chiave_privata.key",
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];
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for pattern in required_patterns {
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let has_exact = gitignore.contains(&pattern);
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let has_wildcard = gitignore.contains(&format!("*.env.local"))
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|| gitignore.contains(&format!(".env.local"));
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let has_env = gitignore.contains("*.env") || gitignore.contains(".env");
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// For .env.local, either .env.local or *.env.local is acceptable
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let is_env_local = pattern == "*.env.local" || pattern == ".env.local";
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if is_env_local {
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assert!(
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has_wildcard,
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".gitignore must contain pattern '*.env.local' or '.env.local' to protect secrets",
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);
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} else if pattern == ".env.production" || pattern == ".env.secret" {
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assert!(
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gitignore.contains(pattern),
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".gitignore must contain pattern '{}' to protect secrets",
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pattern
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);
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} else if pattern == "*.env" {
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assert!(
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has_env,
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".gitignore must contain pattern '*.env' or '.env' to protect secrets",
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);
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} else if pattern == ".env" {
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assert!(
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has_env,
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".gitignore must contain pattern '*.env' or '.env' to protect secrets",
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);
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} else {
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assert!(
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gitignore.contains(pattern),
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".gitignore must contain pattern '{}' to protect secrets",
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pattern
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);
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}
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}
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println!(".gitignore properly protects .env, .pem, and .key files");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_no_private_key_in_git() {
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// Check that .gitignore includes private_key.pem
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let gitignore = match fs::read_to_string(".gitignore") {
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Ok(c) => c,
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Err(e) => {
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println!("WARNING: .gitignore not found: {}", e);
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return;
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}
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};
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assert!(
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gitignore.contains("private_key.pem"),
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".gitignore must block private_key.pem"
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);
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assert!(
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gitignore.contains("privkey.pem"),
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".gitignore must block privkey.pem"
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);
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assert!(gitignore.contains("ec.key"), ".gitignore must block ec.key");
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assert!(
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gitignore.contains("chiave_privata.key"),
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".gitignore must block chiave_privata.key"
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);
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// Check that no private key files are tracked by git
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let output = std::process::Command::new("git")
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.args(&["ls-files", "*.pem", "*.key"])
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.output()
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.expect("Failed to run git ls-files");
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let tracked_keys = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).unwrap();
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let tracked_keys: Vec<&str> = tracked_keys.lines().collect();
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// Only non-empty entries and only public_key.pem should be tracked
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for tracked in tracked_keys.iter().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
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if !tracked.contains("public_key.pem") {
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assert!(
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false,
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"Private key file is tracked by git: {}. Remove it with git rm --cached",
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tracked
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);
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}
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}
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println!("PASS: No private keys tracked in git (only public_key.pem allowed)");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_no_token_in_source_files() {
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// Scan source files for hardcoded tokens
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let mut found_issues = Vec::new();
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// Scan .sh files for hardcoded 40-char hex strings
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for entry in fs::read_dir(".").unwrap().filter_map(|e| e.ok()) {
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let path = entry.path();
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if !path.is_file() {
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continue;
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}
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if let Some(ext) = path.extension() {
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if ext == "sh" {
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let content = fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
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for (line_num, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
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// Skip comments and example/template files
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if line.trim().starts_with("#")
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|| line.to_lowercase().contains("example")
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|| line.to_lowercase().contains("template")
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{
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continue;
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}
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// Check for 40-64 hex chars that could be API tokens (not in .env.example comments)
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if line.trim().len() >= 40 {
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let hex_chars = line
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.trim()
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.chars()
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.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
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.collect::<Vec<_>>();
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if hex_chars.len() >= 40 && hex_chars.len() <= 64 {
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// Check if it looks like it's part of a TOKEN assignment
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if line.to_lowercase().contains("token")
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|| line.to_lowercase().contains("api")
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|| line.to_lowercase().contains("secret")
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{
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found_issues.push(format!(
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"Potential hardcoded token in {}: line {}: {}",
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path.display(),
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line_num + 1,
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line.trim()
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));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if !found_issues.is_empty() {
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println!("FAIL: Found potential hardcoded tokens:");
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for issue in &found_issues {
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println!(" {}", issue);
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}
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assert!(
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false,
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"Found potential hardcoded tokens in shell scripts: {:?}",
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found_issues
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);
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}
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println!("PASS: No hardcoded tokens found in shell scripts");
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}
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